Skill Polarization in Local Labour Markets under Share-Altering Technical Change by Antonio accetturo et al.
     
 
 




QUADERNI DEL DIPARTIMENTO 
DI ECONOMIA POLITICA E STATISTICA 
  










Skill Polarization in Local Labour Markets 







n. 625  –  Novembre  2011 
  
      















   













Abstract. This paper considers the “share-altering” technical change hypothesis in a spatial general 
equilibrium model where individuals have different levels of skills. Building on a simple Cobb-Douglas 
production function, our model shows that the implementation of skill-biased technologies requires a 
sufficient proportion of highly educated individuals. Moreover, areas that experiment this kind of technical 
change will initially exhibit a rise in local skill premia, but such a trend tends to be reverted over time due to 
labour mobility. Also, when technical progress is such to disproportionately replace middle-skill jobs, the 
local distribution of skill will exhibit “fat-tails”, where the proportion of both highly skilled and low-skilled 
workers increases. These predictions are consistent with recent existing evidence. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
  A famous paper by Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) (ALM henceforth) re-qualified the “skill-
biased technical change” hypothesis by noting that, during the last three decades, new technologies have 
been particularly effective in replacing workers who performed “routine tasks”, that is, tasks which require a 
well-defined set of manual and cognitive abilities. Such new technologies have mostly raised the demand for 
highly-skilled workers (mainly college graduates) at the expenses of mid-skilled workers (with high-school 
education), while leaving basically untouched the demand for low-skills, fit to perform non-routine manual 
tasks such as personal services. This technological trend has generated “polarization” in employment and 
wages in the US labour market (Autor et al. 2008, Autor and Dorn 2009). Similar “hollowing-out” patterns 
in wages and employment distribution have been observed in Europe (Goos and Manning 2007, Goos et al. 
2009). How do these economy-wide findings reflect in local labour markets? 
  Recent contributions by Moretti (2010,2011) have argued that labour market outcomes should be 
evaluated at the local level by exploiting spatial general equilibrium models such as Roback (1982), which 
account for local price levels. For instance, he observes that the educated are disproportionately located in 
metropolitan areas characterized by high housing costs. Some analyses of local labour markets have 
emphasized specific features generated by technical change. Beaudry et al. (2010) have shown that skill-
intensive PC technologies have been adopted in cities where highly educated workers were abundant. Also, 
new developments in urban economics have argued that high levels of local human capital may attract even 
more educated workers, as in the “rise of the skilled city” story: see Glaeser (2008) for an overview. In 
particular, Berry and Glaeser (2005) have found that demand for high skilled workers has been rising in 
initially high skill cities. Such models, however, concentrate only on two types of workers and, for this 
reason, are unfit to analyze changes in skill-distribution, like rising “polarization” in the labour market. In 
this perspective, Eeckhout et al. (2010) observe, consistently with the findings of Lin (2011), that large cities 
exhibit “fat-tails” in the skill distribution. In other words, large cities disproportionately attract more skilled 
and more unskilled workers. 
 
  This paper makes a theoretical contribution which accounts for a variety of stylized facts within a 
simple general equilibrium unified framework, where firms and workers are free to move across areas and 
markets are perfectly competitive. We argue that the ATM hypothesis on the nature of recent technological 
change can be given a simple representation by exploiting the idea of “share-altering” technical change. This 
form of technical change, modelled as a change in Cobb-Douglas share parameters, has been recently re-
discovered by Seater (2005), Seater and Peretto (2008) and Zuleta (2008). The idea is rather simple: 
consistently with observation, most modern innovations seem to raise the share parameter of skilled workers, 
while keeping constant the total labour share. At the same time, when one considers a production function 
with three types of workers (high, mid, low skills), ATM supports the view that new technologies have 
disproportionately substituted for “routine” tasks that were mostly occupied by mid-skill workers. We show 
that our model gives similar implications about endogenous skill-biased technology adoption that Beaudry et   2
al. (2010) derive from the “canonical”
1 CES approach. In particular, skill-biased technologies are adopted 
where high skills are relatively abundant
2, adoption tends to raise the skill-premium in the short run, but 
migration tends to equalize the premium economy-wide. More important, by considering three types of 
skills, our model also predicts that places rich in human capital, by favouring the adoption of skill-biased 
technologies, tend to exhibit “fat-tails” in the local skill distribution, as observed by Eeckhout et al. (2010). 
These authors, however, have to resort to a very specific production function, an (additive) Variable 
Elasticity of Substitution production function, to provide a theoretical justification for their empirical 
findings.
3 
  We also draw additional implications for general equilibrium in local labour markets. Since share-
altering technologies can be profitable only when there is an adequate local proportion of skilled workers, it 
follows that areas rich in amenities which are particularly attractive to the more educated are also likely to 
qualify for the adoption of such new technologies. Also, even with factor mobility economy-wide, we can 
have co-existence of different technologies in different areas: in other words, the “technological frontier” can 
differ across places within the same country. Finally, the quality of skill-mix tends to increase further in 
areas where such technologies are adopted: in other words, the model predicts new technologies attract a 
disproportionate inflow of skilled workers, relative to unskilled workers, reinforcing the conditions for future 
adoption of skill-biased technologies. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II.1 describes the basic Roback model, where skilled 
individuals exhibit preferences for local amenities that are partly different from those of the mid-skilled and 
unskilled. Then, in Section II.2, we discuss the implications of share-altering technical change. Section III 
concludes.  
 
                                                 
1 This terminology is borrowed from Acemoglu and Autor (2010). 
2 This implication is similar to Acemoglu (1998), where investment in skill-complementary technologies 
depends on the proportion of skilled individuals in the workforce. In Berry and Glaeser (2005), a higher the 
number of educated residents will generate more skilled entrepreneurs who hire skilled workers. In this 
perspective, the initial level of city skills crucially determines the future level of local skill demand. Our 
view however is closest to Beaudry’s et al. (2010) “comparative advantage” story for technology adoption. 
3 Eeckhout et al (2010) show in fact that a traditional CES predicts different population sizes across cities 
that exhibit different TFP, but it implies the same distribution of skills in every location.   3
II.  THE MODEL 
 
  We consider a standard general equilibrium model, where firms and workers are perfectly mobile 
across areas: see Roback (1982,1988). The economy is composed of two areas, Area 1 and Area 2, which are 
endowed with different characteristics, affecting both local productivity and residents’ “quality of life”. In 
each area, firms produce an homogeneous good by using “land” and three types of labor: unskilled, medium-
skill, skilled.
4 The good is traded competitively across areas. All workers earn a wage and consume both the 
produced good and residential space, “land”. For simplicity, the supply of “land” in each area is taken to be 
fixed and landowners are absentee. Since firms are assumed perfectly mobile between areas, profits will be 
equalized across the economy. Similarly, since mobility costs are taken to be zero, workers’ utility will be 
perfectly equalized across areas. For what it concerns individuals’ utility, we assume that each area possesses 
some local characteristics (such as sunshine or crime) that equally affect the quality of life of all individuals. 
However, we postulate that there are other local features that affect the utility of skilled individuals only.
5 
We start by describing the features of spatial general equilibrium in the absence of technical change. 
 
1. The basic framework 







c n n n l , , , , with  {} 2 , 1 = c . We first illustrate firms’ optimal behavior. Then, we look at workers, so to 
characterize the equilibrium in the two areas.
6 
  
  Firms. Firms in area  {} 2 , 1 = c  produce an homogeneous good by using land,  c L , and all three labor 






c N N N , , , with a Cobb-Douglas technology characterized by constant returns to 
scale: 
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c c c Y c N N N L Q A Y ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
− − − 1 ) (     (1) 
 
where  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ + + γ β α . The term  ) ( c Y Q A  denotes the impact of the vector  c Q  of local characteristics on 
firm’s productivity. We postulate that the elements of  c Q ,  ic q , are measured in a way such that 
                                                 
4 One can think of skilled workers as college graduates and mid-skill workers as individuals holding high-
school diplomas. 
5 This assumption is consistent, for example, with the findings in Carlino and Saiz (2008) for the US, and 
Dalmazzo and de Blasio (2011) for Italy, and is exploited also in some model extensions in Glaeser (2008).  
6 As in the basic spatial framework introduced by Glaeser (2008), we model both preferences and technology 
as Cobb-Douglas functions. However, when Glaeser proceeds to investigate local skill-premia, he drops the 
Cobb-Douglas specification in favour of a CES technology. We show in what follows that this step, under 
the share-altering hypothesis, is unnecessary.   4
0 / ≥ ∂ ∂ ic Y q A .
7  Respectively, {} c c p r ,  denote the local price of land (rent) and the price of the traded good. 
In what follows, we will assume that  1 2 1 = = p p . The wage received by a skilled worker in area c is 
denoted by 
s
c w , the mid-skilled wage is 
m
c w , while the unskilled wage is equal to 
u
c w .  A competitive firm 
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1 ) 1 ( .  Since firms are perfectly mobile across areas, marginal cost 
must be equal to one in both areas (see Appendix A.1 for details). 
  
  Skilled workers. Skilled workers living in area c maximize the utility function 
 
µ µ
c c c U c U
s
c Y L Z B X A U ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
− 1 ) ( ) (     (2) 
 
subject to the budget constraint 
s
c c c c w Y L r = + ⋅ .  Skilled worker’s utility (2) includes an “amenity” term 
() c U X A , non-decreasing in the vector of local characteristics  c X , which is common to mid-skilled and 
unskilled utility (see below). However, skilled utility also includes an additional “amenity” term 
1 ) ( ≥ c U Z B , non-decreasing in  c Z . The vector  c Z  denotes some additional territorial characteristics that 
are valuable to skilled individuals, but irrelevant to the welfare of other workers’ types. The optimal choice 
of the consumption bundle generates an indirect utility for a skilled resident in area  {} 2 , 1 = c  given by: 
 








Z B X A ,  { } 2 , 1 = c    (3) 
 
where 
µ µ µ µ η
− − ≡
1 ) 1 ( . In the absence of mobility costs, a skilled worker is indifferent whether to migrate 
or not whenever the condition 
s s s v = = 2 1 ν ν  holds. 
 
  Mid-skill and unskilled workers. Mid-skill and unskilled workers in area c receive a wage 
respectively equal to 
m
c w  and 
u
c w . By maximizing utility
8 subject to 
m
c c c c w Y L r = + ⋅ , indirect utility of a 








X A , with   {} 2 , 1 = c .  Free 
                                                 
7 The vector of local characteristics affecting firms’ productivity,  c Q , does not necessarily coincide with 
local characteristics affecting residents’ utility. 
8 Mid-skill and unskilled utility has the same structure as skilled utility (2), except for the absence of the 
amenity term  ) ( c U Z B .   5
mobility for mid-skill individuals implies that 
m m m v = = 2 1 ν ν .  Similar expressions hold for unskilled 
workers. 
 
  Equilibrium (without technical change). The relative rent and wage ratios between areas are given by 
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   (7) 
 
These equilibrium expressions have standard interpretations. Equation (4) shows that local 
characteristics that increase productivity and welfare in Area 1 have a positive effect on rents, relative to 
Area 2. However, expression (5) emphasizes that relative abundance of local amenities in Area 1 reduces the 
relative skilled wage in this region. Skilled individuals are ready to accept a lower wages to live in places 
that have higher quality of life. Finally, equations (6) and (7) show that, if Area 1 is relatively richer in 
amenities that are mostly appreciated by the skilled,  1 Z , the mid-skill and unskilled wage in Area 1 tend to 
be relatively higher. This occurs because such specific amenities attract skilled workers to Area 1 and, for 
this reason, mid-skill and unskilled workers become more productive. 
 
  Relative population sizes across areas. The equilibrium derived above characterizes the relative 
prices (rents, wages) across the economy. We now derive the relative equilibrium sizes of skilled, mid-skill 
and unskilled populations in the two areas. Similarly to Roback (1988), the procedure to determine the 
equilibrium populations builds on the labour market-clearing conditions 
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and market-clearing in the market for land: we leave the details to Appendix A.2. In equilibrium, the 
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   (9) 
 
Expression (9) shows that skilled workers will tend to locate in Area 1 when productivity and both types of 
amenities  ) , ( 1 1 Z X  in Area 1 are high relative to Area 2. Thus, local characteristics that enhance 
productivity and welfare are central factors in attracting skilled workers. 
Similar calculations show that the proportion of mid-skill and unskilled workers across areas are 



















































































































































   (11) 
 
Again, higher local productivity (due to  1 Q ) and general amenities (due to 1 X ) in Area 1 will bias the 
location of mid-skill and unskilled workers toward that area. Notice that abundance of local amenities that 
specifically attract skilled individuals ( 1 Z ) will also tend to increase the location of mid-skill and unskilled 
workers in Area 1. When more skilled workers locate in Area 1, the local productivity of mid-skill and 
unskilled workers will increase, raising the demand for their labor services. 
   The model has immediate implications about what drives the local skill mix across areas. Consider 
















































1 log log log log , equations (9) and (10) can be used to characterize the 
difference in the skill mix across areas, given by the following expression:  








































     (12) 
 
Expression (12) shows that differences in the local proportion between skilled and mid-skill workers only 
depend on differences in amenities that are specific to the tastes of the skilled, such as those included in 
vector  c Z .
9 Identical conclusions are reached when one considers the proportion between skilled and 
unskilled individuals. This is a relevant implication for the local “college-share”. Indeed, Area 1 will have a 
higher ratio of skilled vs. mid-skill and unskilled individuals only when endowed, relative to Area 2, with 
characteristics that are particularly appreciated by the more educated. Consequently, since the local ratio 






































1 < . Identical 
considerations hold for the local ratio between skilled and unskilled wages.
10 Thus, the following holds: 
 
  Result 1. Skilled labor is cheaper in areas that are relatively rich in amenities which are particularly 
attractive to the educated. 
 
As argued in what follows, the local capacity to attract skilled individuals may be crucial for the 
implementation of skill-biased technologies. We will show that, when adopted, such new technologies raise 
the local concentration of human capital even further. Thus, although local amenities remain a precondition, 
our conclusions are compatible with the observation of Moretti (2010) that, in the US between 1980 and 
2000, changes in the geographical location of skilled workers were mostly driven by changes in their relative 
demand (i.e., technology), rather than supply (i.e., local amenities). 
 
 
  2. Skill-biased share-altering technical change. 
In the last decades, a large body of literature has emphasized the so-called “skilled-biased technical 
change”
11, with demand for skilled workers growing faster than the pool of educated individuals. This view 
                                                 
9 In fact, in this Cobb-Douglas model, local general amenities ( c X ) and productivity advantages ( c Q ) affect 
skilled, mid-skill and unskilled individuals in the same way and, thus, they are unable to affect the local skill 
mix. See also Glaeser (2008). 























1 < . 
11 In terms of production theory, technical change is skill-biased if it increases the marginal productivity of 
skilled workers relative to other factors: see Acemoglu (2002, p.785). Typically, representations of skill-  8
has been refined by some contributions following Autor et al. (2003), which have shown that recent 
technological advances embodied in information and communication technology are particularly fit to 
execute “routine” tasks that were previously performed by middle-skill workers: see Autor and Acemoglu 
(2010) for an overview. This has caused severe consequences to the returns of certain types of skill that we 
will model as shifts in the shares associated with different types of labour. Indeed, some recent literature on 
economic growth has investigated technological change as directly represented by changes in share 
parameters. Seater (2005), Peretto and Seater (2008), and Zuleta (2008), observing the historical fall in the 
share of raw labour in the US, together with the stability of the share going to labour income, have explored 
some implications of the “share-altering” technical change hypothesis with Cobb-Douglas production 
functions.
12 
The share-altering representation of technological change is very convenient in our Cobb-Douglas 
spatial model. Recent technological advances are biased toward skills but, at the same time, they do not 
substitute for manual low-skill jobs, such as truck driving. Thus, we can explore the impact of an increase in 
skilled workers’ share that is exactly matched by a decrease in the mid-skilled share. Since one can 
reasonably assume that the low-skill share remains constant, the overall income share of labour remains 
unchanged. In particular, by referring to the Cobb-Douglas technology (1), we suppose that – at date t=0 - a 
new, share-altering, technology becomes available. The new technology
13 is such that the share of skilled 
labour α  increases by  0 ≥ ∆ , while the share of mid-skill labour β  is reduced by the same amount, so that 
the total labour share,  γ β α + + , remains constant. Share-altering technical change is thus associated with 
the following production function:
14 
 
() ( ) ( )





c c c Y c N N N L Q A Y ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
∆ − ∆ + − − − 1 ) (     (13) 
 
  The following result, an immediate application of the Envelope Theorem
15, holds true: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
biased technical change rely on CES production functions, as for example in Acemoglu (2002) and Beaudry 
et al. (2010). For an argument about the (presumed) unsuitability of Cobb-Douglas production functions, see 
Acemoglu (2003, p.3). 
12 The share-altering hypothesis (not entirely novel, as noticed by Seater 2005), is consistent with several 
observations about growth history: factor-intensity is determined by factor abundance, the decrease in “raw” 
labour share while the total labour share does not change over economic development, underdevelopment 
due to inability to adopt advanced technologies in certain labour markets. Importantly, as shown in Zuleta 
(2008, p.838), a Cobb-Douglas function with share-altering innovations exhibits an elasticity of substitution 
greater than one, as commonly assumed in CES representations: see Acemoglu and Autor (2010). 
13 As in Beaudry et al. (2010) and, in general, in this kind of literature, we abstract from implementation 
costs of new technologies. Such costs are instead considered in the growth analysis by Seater and Peretto 
(2008) and Zuleta (2008). 
14 Notice that the production function (13) implies that the ratio between the marginal productivity of skilled 
labour and the marginal productivity of other factors is increasing in ∆. Thus, this form of technical change is 
consistent with Acemoglu’s (2002) definition of skill-biased technical change. 
15 See Appendix A.3 for details of the proof.   9
  Result 2. Each individual firm will find it profitable to adopt the share-altering technology (13) when 



















. Under local labour market clearing, this inequality is satisfied  when 
Area c is sufficiently rich in skills, that is, when it holds that: 
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, condition (14) implies that each individual firm will find it profitable to adopt the share-






 is lower than 
β
α
.  This has an immediate explanation. 






 is high) 
is characterized by a relatively low skill-premium. Thus, the presence of cheap skilled labour in the local 
labour market may make it convenient to adopt skilled biased technologies: see also Beaudry et al. (2010).  
Result 2 has another remarkable implication. Suppose that in Area 1 the ratio between skilled and unskilled 
individuals is greater than 1 while, in Area 2, is less than 1. Then, firms locating in Area 1 will find it 
profitable to implement the new technology (13), with  0 > ∆ , while firms locating in Area 2 will stick to the 
“old” technology, given by (1). Thus, the spatial general equilibrium approach shows that different 
technologies can coexist across different areas within the same economy. 
 
  In what follows, we give some results deriving from the share-altering hypothesis which pertain to 
(i) the size of local skill-premia, and (ii) the skill mix of local populations across areas in spatial general 
equilibrium. 
 
  Implications for local skill-premia. When at date t=0 condition (14) is respected only in Area 1, the 
local skill-premium must be lower than the one in Area 2. Once adopted, the share-altering technology will 























 is increasing in ∆. Thus, areas where the skilled-biased technology is adopted exhibit – 
at least, initially - an increase in the local skill-premium.  However, since the workforce is mobile, the direct 
impact on the skill-premium caused by  0 > ∆  will be entirely compensated by re-adjustments in the local 
skill-mix caused by migrations over time. The proof for this claim, as in Glaeser (2008), goes as follows.   10
Recall that the indirect utility of a skilled worker is equal to  () ()
µ η
− ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
1 / ) ( c
s
c c U c U
s
r w Z B X A v , where 
s
v  
denotes the “reservation utility” of skilled individuals across the economy (with free-mobility). Similarly, the 
indirect utility of an mid-skilled worker is given by  ( )
µ η
− ⋅ ⋅ =




r w X A v , where 
m
v  denotes the 
“reservation utility” of the mid-skill individuals in the economy. Thus, in equilibrium, the wage-premium in 
Area c is given by: 
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Expression (15) shows that the wage-gap between high-skilled and mid-skilled workers depend on amenities 
that affect skilled utility, and it does not depend on technological factors, such as ∆. Similar considerations 
hold for the wage-ratio of high-skill and unskilled workers. Thus, as will be confirmed in what follows, there 
must occur re-adjustments in the skill-mix across areas which exactly compensate for the direct effect 
generated by the adoption of the new technology.  The following statement summarizes the conclusions 
obtained so far: 
 
  Result 3 (Skill-premia). The adoption of a skill-biased share-altering technology has a positive effect 
on the local skill-premium that is, at most, temporary. Re-adjustments in the local skill-mix will entirely 
compensate the initial positive effect, taking the local skill-premium back to its pre-adoption level. 
 
  The prediction that local changes in technology tend to have mostly a transitory effect on local skill 
premia is consistent with the evidence reported in Beaudry et al. (2010). They observe that during an 
adjustment to a new technological paradigm, the returns to skill increase most where skill is more abundant 
but, over the long run, the supply of skill will exert downward pressure on skill premium. However, although 
local skill premia tend to revert to their pre-implementation level, technological change has permanent 
effects on the distribution of skills within each area. In order to show this, we first derive some spatial 
general equilibrium implications of share-altering technical change on relative prices across areas.  As shown 
in Appendix A.4, the following result holds: 
 
  Result 4 (Relative rents and wages). Share-altering technical change localized in Area 1 will raise 
rents and wages relative to Area 2. 
 
  We can now analyse what happens to equilibrium skill distributions in the two areas when share-
altering technological change occurs (all derivations are reported in Appendix A.5).  The impact on the ratio 
between high-skill populations in Area 1 and 2 is given by: 
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Thus, a localised skill-biased technological change will generate a relative increase in the skilled 
population of that area. The opposite result generally holds for the mid-skilled, which we mainly identify 
with of high-school educated individuals. Share-altering technical change has the following effect on the 
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The sign of expression (17) is ambiguous in principle. However, plausible values of the parameters 
imply that technological change will generally reduce the relative size of the mid-skilled population in Area 
1.
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  Inspection of (16), (17), and (18) immediately shows that skill-biased share-altering technical change 
will generate thicker tails in the distribution of skills in Area 1, relative to Area 2. This conclusion is 
summarized in the following: 
 
Result 5 (Local skills distributions). Since it hold that: 
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the local implementation of skill-biased share-altering technologies will generate a skill distribution 
with “fatter tails”. The local population of low-skilled and –to a greater extent- the population of highly-
skilled increase, relative to the population endowed with middle-skills. 
 
Thus, our simple model has implications consistent with the finding in Eeckhout et al (2010) that 
large cities have fatter tails in skill-distribution. The reason here is the following. Places that attract highly 
                                                 





log 0 < Σ ; for example, when β=2/9, 
(17) is negative when  4
15
0 log < Σ . Thus, if ( ) 0 logΣ >0 is not implausibly large, this derivative will have a 
negative sign. The parameterization of factor-shares is consistent with Mankiw et al. (1992).   12
skilled individuals tend to grow larger and richer in human capital (as shown above). As a consequence, such 
locations will be more prone to endogenous adoption of skill-biased technologies that, as documented by 
Autor et al. (2003) and Goos and Manning (2007), come at a disadvantage for jobs typically occupied by 
mid-skill individuals. Similar conclusions, at the local level, are reached by Lin (2010,p.565). 
Result 5 can be restated in terms of an improvement of the skill mix in Area 1.  Since it holds
17 that  
() () []
0
1 1 / log / log
1 , 0





> Σ ≈ ∆ β α d
n n n n d
m s m s
, skilled-biased share-altering technical change localized 
in Area 1 will lead to a further concentration of skills in that region. Hence, when Area 1 is fit to adopt 
skilled-biased share-altering technologies (i.e., when condition (14) is satisfied), later on it will be ready to 
implement additional technological advances of the same kind. By contrast, if the innovation could not be 
profitably adopted in Area 2, this region will remain stuck with the old technology also in the future. This 
implies that, even within the same country, output will grow in Area 1, while Area 2 stagnates (see also 
Seater 2005).   
                                                 
17 Combining (16) and (17) gives  ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] ∆ − = ∆ − d n n n n d d n n n n d
m s m s m m s s / / log / log / / log / log 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 .   13
III.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The hypothesis of (skill-biased) share-altering technical change has several implications. The first 
one, mostly technical, is that we can represent such bias and the reduction in demand for mid-skill 
individuals even with the simplest Cobb-Douglas production function. Thus, there is no need to use more 
cumbersome CES technologies, as for the spatial general equilibrium analysis by Glaeser (2008) and the 
labor-market analysis in Beaudry et al. (2010), or even Variable Elasticity of Substitution functions as in 
Eeckhout et al. (2010), to model some main stylized facts that have been occurring in local labor markets 
during the last three decades. 
The main contribution of this framework is related to the spatial general equilibrium implications of 
share-altering technical change. In particular, the model draws some specific conclusions about path-
dependency in regional development. Only areas that are sufficiently rich in human capital will be ready to 
adopt skilled-biased share-altering technological advancements. This is consistent with the “comparative 
advantage” story of Beaudry et al. (2010), who find that skill abundance is associated with skilled-biased 
technology adoption and, in particular, adoption is more intense where skills are cheaper. Moreover, our 
model suggests that, after implementation of new technologies, human capital tends to move more and more 
from areas that exhibit a relatively poor skill mix, to areas that are already rich in educated workers. As a 
result, there will be further polarization in the composition of the local labour force across the economy. This 
prediction is consistent with the empirical results reported in Berry and Glaeser (2005) and Glaeser and 
Gottlieb (2008): areas which are rich in human capital (a pre-condition for the adoption of skilled-biased 
technologies, here) will attract a disproportionate number of skilled workers. Further, such migratory 
movements generate “fat-tails” in the skill distribution in places where new technologies are implemented: 
this is consistent with evidence in Eeckhout et al (2010). 
Finally, the model raises some policy questions. The existence of relevant non-linear effects of local 
skills, documented in Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008), may suggest that there can be returns from pushing 
skilled workers into already skilled areas. However, this would mean to subsidize areas that are rich in 
human capital. Such a policy seems inequitable and improper, because skilled people tend to move towards 
skilled places even without government aid. Still, our approach suggests that in an economy characterized by 
a low average level of education, it may be desirable to concentrate human capital in few specific places to 
get sort of areas of “excellence”
18, which allow for the adoption of techniques that would otherwise be 
unprofitable. In our perspective, this kind of intervention can be implemented by subsidizing local amenities 
that prove to be particularly attractive to educated individuals.   
 
                                                 
18 Examples of such policies in the US are given by Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008, p.224-25).   14
APPENDIX 
 
A.1  Derivation of relative local rents and wages in equilibrium. 
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By substituting (A1.2), (A1.3) and (A1.4) into (A1.1), one obtains expression (4) in the text. Then, exploiting 
(4) to substitute into (A1.2), (A1.3) and (A1.4) one obtains, respectively, (5), (6) and (7) in the text. 
 
 
A.2.  Derivation of relative population sizes in equilibrium. 
  Profit maximization for firms located in area c implies that the demands for highly skilled labour 
s
c N , mid-skilled labour 
m
c N , unskilled labour 
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 (A2.1) 
 
In equilibrium, skilled labour demand 
s
c N  must be equal to its local supply 
s
c n . Also, mid-skill labor 
demand 
m
c N  and unskilled labour demand 
u
c N  must be equal, respectively, to local mid-skill labor supply   15
m
c n  and unskilled supply, 
u
c n . Finally, the local supply of land,  c l , must be equal to the total demand for 
land, which is given by the sum of land demanded by firms (as from A2.1), plus the land demanded by the 
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c w n w n w n ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ,  away in (A2.5), one obtains: 
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which can be substituted back into (A2.2), (A2.3) and (A2.4) to obtain:  
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    (A2.10) 
 
Taking logs of (A2.10) and using (4) and (5), one obtains equation (9) in the text. Using a similar procedure, 
one can exploit (A2.8) and (A2.9) to obtain, respectively, (10) and (11) in the text. 
 
 
  A.3.  Proof of Result 2. 
  Share-altering technical change, summarized by  0 > ∆ , will be adopted by local firms when it has a 




















































































  A.4.  Derivation of relative rents and wages under technical change. 
  We now explore the effects of share-altering technological change localized only in Area 1 on 
relative local prices across the two regions. To this purpose, we will evaluate the results for an initially given 
skill-ratio, 
m s N N 1 1 / , set equal to the constant  1 0 > Σ . Moreover, derivatives in comparative statics results 
will be calculated by setting  0 ≈ ∆ , that is, evaluating the impact of change by starting with the same 
production function in both areas.  
  Since condition (14) is satisfied in Area 1, but not in Area 2, firms in the former region (costlessly) 
adopt the share-altering innovation, while firms in the latter one continue to use the old technology. Under 
perfect competition in tradable good production, price (the numeraire) equals marginal cost, implying that 
firms locating in Area 1 will respect the following condition: 
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will continue to hold. Free mobility implies that, in equilibrium, firms must make zero profit no matter where 



























































































   (A4.3) 
 
  By substituting equations (A1.2), (A1.3) and (A1.4) into (A4.3), one obtains that (the log of) the 
equilibrium rent-ratio between Area 1 and Area 2: 
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. Differentiating (A4.4) with respect to ∆, 
and evaluating the result for  0 ≈ ∆  and  1 0
1
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r r d
   (A4.5) 
 
Since  1 0 > Σ , the sign of expression (A4.5) is positive. Thus, localized skill-biased technical change will 
increase rents in Area 1 relative to Area 2.   18
Consider now the impact of the change in the skilled share on the skilled wage-ratio across areas. By 
exploiting (A1.2), differentiating with respect to ∆, and evaluating the result for  0 ≈ ∆  and  1 0
1











































  Similarly, one can use (A1.3) and (A1.4) to assess the impact of share-altering change on relative 
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   (A4.7) 
 
 
  Expressions (A4.6) and (A4.7) confirm that, with labor mobility, local skill premia are unaffected by 
technical change, as emphasized by (15). 
 
 
  A.3.  Populations and share-altering technical change. 
We first analyze the impact of skill-biased share-altering technical change on the relative size of the 
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while for Area 2 equation (A2.7) still holds. Hence, with share-altering technical change, the skilled-
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Taking the logs of (A5.2), differentiating with respect to ∆, and calculating the resulting expression for ∆≈0, 
one obtains:  
   19
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which gives expression (16) in the text. 
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while for Area 2 equation (A2.8) still holds. Hence, the unskilled population ratio is equal to: 
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Differentiating the log of (A5.5) with respect to ∆ and calculating the result for ∆≈0, one obtains:  
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which gives expression (17) in the text. 
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Differentiating the log of (A5.7) with respect to ∆ and calculating the result for ∆≈0, one obtains:  
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which gives expression (18). 
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